The European Institute for Peace and Governance (EIPG) 

Modern arms smuggling networks no longer operate solely across borders; they move through quiet cities, obscure companies, and individuals living inside some of the world’s most tightly regulated environments. From there, invisible routes begin, often ending in active war zones.

In an era of increasing restrictions on the global arms trade, these networks have adapted. Entire systems of financing, coordination, and logistics are now managed through parallel economies capable of circumventing sanctions and redirecting resources across multiple continents. From the Middle East to Africa, and from paper-registered shell companies to intermediaries operating within Western countries, a transnational web is taking shape, one that is increasingly difficult to trace or dismantle.

Within this context, conflicts such as the war in Sudan cannot be viewed in isolation. They are closely tied to cross-border arms flows that play a decisive role in reshaping power dynamics on the ground and prolonging violence.

It is here that the case of Shamim Mafi (44) emerges not merely as a criminal file in the United States, but as a window into an informal network of brokers, front companies, and complex financial pathways. These structures enable Iran to continue moving weapons despite international restrictions.

How do these networks operate across continents? How do they bypass sanctions? And who are the actors behind these hidden routes?

From Broker to Network: How the Most Dangerous Link Operates

The case of Shamim Mafi does not merely reveal the role of a passing intermediary in an arms deal; it sheds light on one of the most critical and least visible components of modern smuggling systems: transnational brokerage.

According to court documents, Mafi’s role was neither technical nor limited. Instead, it revolved around connecting multiple actors across different jurisdictions, in an operation that went beyond a simple transaction to the coordination of an entire logistical and financial network. This type of role often carried out by individuals with legal residency or dual citizenship provides an ideal cover for operating outside formal channels, while distancing any direct link between states and illicit transactions.

Mafi was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport while attempting to leave the United States. If convicted, she faces a sentence of up to 20 years in federal prison, a case that underscores how a single intermediary can serve as the central node in a much larger, hidden network.

In this context, brokerage is not merely a function, it is a central node in the smuggling chain. Through it, transportation is organized, payment channels are secured, and front companies and unconventional financial routes are deployed, reflecting a flexible and adaptive network structure.

Mark Bellani, a senior researcher on informal economies at the Institute for Peace and War Studies in the United States, explains: “The broker in these networks does not physically move weapons, but moves the relationship between money and weapons, which makes their role more dangerous than any other link.”

Evidence from the case suggests that the operation was not a one-off transaction, but part of a recurring pattern. It relied on breaking the process into separate stages of procurement, transport, and financing making it difficult to trace or attribute to a single source.

Rachel McLiff, an expert in tracking illicit networks, adds: “These networks are designed to avoid exposure. Each actor knows only a fragment of the operation, which makes dismantling the entire system a complex challenge even for intelligence agencies.”

This model allows Iran, and similar actors, to operate within a “grey zone” between formal and informal systems where responsibility is diffused, traces are indirect, and plausible deniability is significantly higher.

As a result, the case moves beyond an individual criminal file to reveal a broader structure: a tightly interconnected network of intermediaries operating in the shadows, reshaping the routes of global arms flows in the post-sanctions era.

According to court filings, Mafi acted as a broker in multiple military transactions on behalf of the Iranian government. These included the sale of drones, ammunition, and military components to Sudan. Documents indicate that she facilitated a contract worth more than $70 million for the sale of a Mohajer-6 drone to the Sudanese military, coordinated visits by Sudanese delegations to Iran, and received millions of dollars in return.

Image from U.S. prosecution documents detailing the case against Shamim Mafi and her role as a transnational broker in arms deals linked to Iran.

According to prosecutors, Mafi was subjected to repeated questioning by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials upon entering the United States between 2021 and 2024. During these interviews, she frequently disclosed her connections to the Iranian government, including that her former husband was an Iranian intelligence officer.

Prosecutors say Mafi acknowledged awareness of how the Iranian government circumvents sanctions and engages in money laundering activities. She claimed that her work focused on arranging medical aid shipments to African countries, though authorities argue this served as a cover within a broader network facilitating illicit transfers and coordination.

The Shadow Economy as a Tool: A Hidden Architecture of Influence

In Iran’s case, reliance on what is often described as the “shadow economy” is no longer a tactical workaround to bypass sanctions, it has evolved into a fully integrated system for managing influence beyond formal structures.

This ecosystem, which includes oil smuggling networks, front companies, and informal payment mechanisms such as hawala systems, does more than generate financial resources. It creates an alternative, parallel infrastructure capable of operating independently from the global financial system.

Within this framework, the shadow economy is not merely a source of funding, but a strategic instrument for redirecting resources toward military and security activities without passing through internationally monitored channels. By fragmenting financial flows and reassembling them across complex, multi-layered networks, this model significantly reduces the effectiveness of sanctions and makes tracing transactions increasingly difficult.

Image of Shamim Mafi alongside documents detailing arms shipments she allegedly facilitated on behalf of Iran.

Nicholas Mulder, a political economist and expert on sanctions at Princeton University, argues that: “Sanctions do not necessarily fail because they are weak, but because targeted actors continuously develop parallel systems that allow them to circumvent restrictions and rebuild financial channels.”

Similarly, Mark Galeotti, a specialist in transnational organized crime, notes: “The shadow economy does not function as a temporary workaround, but as a permanent system, where informal financial networks integrate with security activities, making it difficult to separate economics from conflict.”

These dynamics reveal that what is taking place is not a series of isolated smuggling operations or individual arms deals, but an interconnected system in which resources, whether oil revenues or informal financial flows, are transformed into instruments of military and logistical influence across regional networks.

Mulder further explains: “In such networks, resources are not used solely for profit, but to reshape power balances, as the informal economy becomes a tool of political and security influence.”

In this sense, a single arms deal is no longer an isolated event, but part of a broader cycle of resource circulation within a closed system, one in which money is generated, transferred, and converted into military capabilities through flexible and adaptive structures.

While this model may prove effective in the short term, it also creates deep structural risks. It distorts domestic economies, reinforces corruption, and widens the gap between formal institutions and informal networks, ultimately making long-term economic and political stability more fragile.

Sudan: A Testing Ground for Arms Networks

Within this context, the war in Sudan can no longer be understood as a purely internal conflict. It has increasingly become a battlefield shaped by transnational supply networks, playing a direct role in escalating military operations and expanding their scope.

According to court filings, Shamim Mafi acted as a broker in multiple military transactions on behalf of the Iranian government. These included the sale of drones, ammunition, and military components to Sudan. Documents indicate that she facilitated a contract worth more than $70 million for the sale of a Mohajer-6 drone to the Sudanese military, coordinated visits by Sudanese delegations to Iran, and received millions of dollars in return.

Her alleged activities also extended to brokering additional deals, including the sale of approximately 55,000 bomb fuzes, as well as millions of rounds of ammunition all within a broader network transferring military equipment from Iran to Sudan.

Military experts and reports suggest that Iranian drones, including models such as the Mohajer-6, have significantly enhanced the operational capabilities of the Sudanese army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, particularly in reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities.

Alex de Waal, a leading researcher on armed conflicts in Africa, explains: “The flow of external weapons does not only shift the balance of power, it prolongs war and increases its humanitarian cost — especially when advanced technologies like drones are involved.”

He adds that: “The use of drones in asymmetric conflicts gives one side a rapid tactical advantage, but at the same time raises the level of violence and increases the likelihood of targeting civilian areas.”

Evidence of ongoing arms flows emerged as recently as December, when a Boeing 747 cargo aircraft operated by Iran’s Qeshm Fars Air departed from Bandar Abbas airport, heading toward the Red Sea before disappearing from flight tracking systems.

Hours later, satellite imagery showed a similar aircraft on the runway at Port Sudan airport, a facility controlled by the Sudanese military. The same route was reportedly repeated five times through the end of January, coinciding with reports documenting the deployment of Iranian drones in the conflict.

Qeshm Fars Air is under U.S. sanctions, accused of transporting weapons and fighters across multiple conflict zones in the Middle East, including Syria, one of Tehran’s key allies.

Image of the Iranian cargo aircraft that allegedly transported weapons shipments to the Sudanese army, arriving at Port Sudan Airport.

Shamim Mafi’s role does not resemble that of a traditional intermediary in arms deals. Rather, she appears as a central operational node within a transnational network one that brings together financing, logistical coordination, and the management of relationships between multiple actors.

This type of intermediary goes beyond simply facilitating transactions. It reshapes the entire trajectory of a deal from the origin of the weapons to their final destination enabling the fragmentation of responsibility and obscuring the true source of supply.

In this sense, arms deals are no longer just illicit commercial transactions; they become direct instruments in shaping battlefield realities, fuelling violence, and expanding the scope of conflict, with consequences that extend far beyond the war zone itself.

Accordingly, the flow of weapons into Sudan cannot be viewed in isolation from this broader framework. Available evidence suggests that the documented shipments, whether through deals allegedly brokered by Mafi or via suspicious cargo flights form part of an integrated supply chain.

This network does not merely transport military equipment; it sustains continuous channels of communication and coordination between Tehran and Sudanese military actors on the ground.

An Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone and two Qaem precision-guided bombs reportedly transferred from Iran to the Sudanese military.

Intersections with Power: Where Does the Sudanese Government Stand?

The flow of weapons into Sudan cannot be understood in isolation from the seat of power in Port Sudan, where the country’s military leadership, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, is based.

Documented evidence including U.S. sanctions points to the role of Mirghani Idris Suleiman, Director General of Sudan’s Defense Industries System, widely considered the military’s primary arm for procurement. He has been linked to efforts to secure weapons, including Iranian drones and other external military deals.

According to these findings, such channels have contributed to strengthening the Sudanese army’s capabilities in a conflict that has prolonged the war and significantly increased its humanitarian cost, particularly for civilians.

In this context, one expert working with international conflict-monitoring bodies, who requested anonymity, stated: “In environments like this, a shipment of this scale does not move without the knowledge of senior military circles. The question is not whether there is awareness, but how far that coordination goes.”

Figures close to al-Burhan including Malik Agar and Ibrahim Jaber Ibrahim also emerge as key facilitators in arranging and overseeing arms transfers from Iran to Sudan through intermediaries, as well as helping to manage the financial arrangements tied to these operations.

As a result, military supply networks do not appear as separate or independent channels, but rather as part of a broader ecosystem where state authority intersects with transnational procurement networks  complicating efforts to trace, regulate, or hold actors accountable.

A Transnational Network

From the United States, where the intermediary resides, through financial networks routed across third countries, and into conflict zones in Africa, a transnational system begins to take shape, one that operates outside conventional frameworks and exploits legal and regulatory gaps between jurisdictions.

Evidence outlined in the case file suggests that these activities were not detached from Iran’s official structures, but were connected to channels of communication and coordination with governmental and semi-governmental entities, including institutions linked to the defence sector.

This model reflects Tehran’s reliance on intermediary networks operating beyond formal channels, allowing it to transfer weapons into conflict zones while reducing political costs and maintaining plausible deniability.

Shamim Mafi, an Iranian national, obtained lawful permanent residency in the United States in October 2016. She owns and operates a company based in Oman, Atlas International Business LLC, also known as Atlas Global Holding and Atlas Tech LLC.

In early 2025, Mafi allegedly acted as a broker in arms deals on behalf of Iran through her company, further illustrating how private entities are integrated into broader state-linked networks facilitating the movement of military equipment across borders.

Mark Wilson, an investigator who has worked with UN-affiliated international panels on smuggling and corruption, explains that this pattern is common across illicit networks, where formally registered companies are used as legal cover for unlawful activities.

He adds: “This model allows transactions to move across multiple systems without raising immediate red flags.”

Investigations also suggest that Mafi did not operate alone. Communication records reveal repeated contact between her and phone numbers linked to an Iranian intelligence officer, reinforcing the likelihood that these deals were connected to broader networks operating beyond official channels.

At the same time, the case highlights the role of intermediaries operating from within Western countries. Their legal residency enables them to navigate advanced financial and commercial systems, giving these networks greater capacity to organize operations and circumvent restrictions.

As such, this network appears not merely as a route for arms transfers, but as an integrated structure linking intermediaries, companies, and financial channels — stretching from Tehran to the Gulf and into Africa — operating in the shadows and exploiting overlaps between legal and geographic boundaries.

According to U.S. authorities, these activities constitute violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which imposes strict restrictions on transactions involving the Iranian government and affiliated entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Ministry of Defense, without prior authorization from the U.S. Treasury.

Sanctions and Their Limits: Why They Are Not Enough

Despite tightened international sanctions on Iran in recent years, this case exposes the limitations of such measures when confronting flexible and adaptive networks. By design, sanctions primarily target states and formal institutions, but they increasingly struggle to address systems operating outside those frameworks.

In this context, arms smuggling activities do not cease — they evolve. Networks restructure themselves through alternative channels, relying on individual intermediaries, front companies, and informal financial transfers, allowing them to operate beyond traditional oversight mechanisms.

The operations attributed to Mafi are not an exception, but part of a broader model in which Iran relies on what can be described as “indirect operations.” Through multiple layers of intermediaries and shell entities, military resources are transferred in ways that bypass international controls, effectively turning smuggling networks into an unofficial extension of regional policy.

Juan Zarate, a former U.S. Treasury official and expert in political economy, notes: “Sanctions can pressure states, but they rarely stop informal networks, which adapt quickly and find alternative pathways to operate.”
He adds: “Informal systems are resilient because they do not rely on a centralized structure that can be easily targeted, but on a network of replaceable actors.”

This does not mean sanctions are ineffective — rather, their effectiveness depends on how they are applied. Experts argue that sanctions can significantly disrupt illicit networks when they shift from targeting states to targeting the networks themselves, including intermediaries, front companies, and supply chains.

This requires enhanced tracking of informal financial flows, targeted sanctions against individuals and intermediary entities, and stronger international cooperation in intelligence sharing.

Linking sanctions to enforcement tools — such as international prosecutions, supply-chain monitoring, and tighter oversight of companies registered in low-transparency jurisdictions — can further restrict the operational space of these networks.

Ultimately, the issue is not the absence of sanctions, but a mismatch between the nature of the threat and the tools used to confront it. As long as sanctions remain focused primarily on states, networks will continue to adapt. Expanding their scope to include informal structures could transform sanctions from a limited pressure tool into a more effective mechanism for disrupting arms smuggling.

Beyond the Case: A Recurring Model

The case of Shamim Mafi does not represent an isolated incident. Rather, it places Iran’s broader operational model under scrutiny, a system built on leveraging informal networks to bypass sanctions and project power beyond its borders without bearing direct political costs.

Within this model, Iran does not rely solely on traditional state channels, but operates through layered networks of intermediaries, front companies, and informal financial systems. These structures enable it to function within “grey zones” that are difficult to regulate or hold accountable under international law.

Instead of direct confrontation, influence is exported through these networks into fragile conflict zones, where smuggled weapons become a decisive factor in escalating and prolonging violence.

Richard Nephew, a former U.S. State Department official and sanctions expert, explains: “Sanctioned states do not stop operating, they adapt, developing alternative networks that allow them to continue in more complex and less traceable ways.”
He adds:  “The use of intermediaries and front companies is not only about concealment, but about fragmenting responsibility, making it harder to directly link activities back to the state.”

This model extends beyond security implications. It represents a structural challenge to the international system itself, where sanctions rather than solely acting as a deterrent can unintentionally drive the expansion of shadow economies and increase reliance on informal networks.

In this context, countries like Sudan become real-world testing grounds for such strategies. The flow of weapons translates directly into battlefield realities: intensified military operations, infrastructure targeting, and rising civilian casualties all without the actors behind these networks appearing directly on the front lines.

Edward Fishman, an expert in international economic security and former U.S. Treasury official, notes: “The challenge today is no longer imposing sanctions, but targeting the networks that emerge around them, networks that are often more flexible and harder to disrupt.”

In this light, the case of Shamim Mafi is no longer just a criminal matter involving sanctions violations. It becomes an indicator of a broader operational model, one through which weapons are transferred and influence is redistributed via informal networks. This model, combining shadow economies with transnational brokerage, allows Iran to operate within spaces that are difficult to regulate, while maintaining sufficient distance to avoid direct accountability.

As long as this dynamic persists, Iran will continue to leverage these networks as instruments of indirect influence. Conflicts in places like Sudan will remain open arenas for forces that rarely appear in headlines, yet steadily reshape the balance of power on the ground.

The story does not end with the arrest of an intermediary at an airport, it begins there. As long as the underlying infrastructure enabling these networks remains intact, without raising their operational costs, dismantling their pathways, and reducing their financial incentives, this model will endure.

And with it, the cycle of violence and instability will continue, not only in Africa, but across the broader international system