The European Institute for Peace and Governance (EIPG)

Europe is approaching a political threshold that would have appeared improbable little more than a decade ago. Parties once confined to the margins of national politics now lead governments, influence governing coalitions, dominate opposition blocs or compete for first place across several major European democracies. The shift is no longer adequately described as an occasional “far-right surge.” It is becoming a structural transformation of the European party system. The 2024 European Parliament election already demonstrated the scale of the change: Patriots for Europe emerged with 84 seats, the European Conservatives and Reformists with 78 and Europe of Sovereign Nations with 25, while traditional liberal and green forces lost ground. The European People’s Party remained the largest parliamentary group, meaning the radical right did not “take control” of the European Parliament, but the balance of political competition shifted markedly to the right.

By September 2026, that shift has moved beyond Brussels. Alternative for Germany won 43.8 percent in the Saxony-Anhalt state election, an unprecedented result for the party there, while radical-right politics has become an increasingly important force in Germany’s regional landscape. Italy is already governed by a right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni, even as a new force further to her right, Roberto Vannacci’s National Future, attempts to capture voters dissatisfied with her government. France is approaching a 2027 presidential election in which the National Rally is a central contender, although the outcome remains open and current polling cannot establish who will ultimately win. Four major EU states—France, Italy, Poland and Spain—are due to hold important national elections in 2027, giving the next electoral cycle potentially major consequences for European governance.

Yet describing this phenomenon simply as a triumph of extremism risks missing what is actually changing. Europe’s radical and populist right is advancing partly because it has succeeded in connecting previously separate sources of public dissatisfaction: migration, cost-of-living pressures, energy prices, insecurity, distrust of institutions, cultural change, dissatisfaction with established parties and anxiety over national sovereignty. These parties do not hold identical positions and should not be treated as a single movement. Their approaches to Russia, NATO, Ukraine, economic policy, welfare, the European Union and fiscal policy differ substantially. What connects many of them is a political argument that national governments have surrendered too much control to supranational institutions and that established political elites have failed to protect citizens from the disruptive consequences of globalisation, migration and geopolitical instability.

For the European Institute for Peace and Governance (EIPG), the central question is therefore larger than whether Europe’s right will gain additional votes. It concerns what happens to democratic governance when political systems built around post-war centre-left and centre-right competition fragment into increasingly polarised blocs. Europe may be entering an era in which coalition formation becomes harder, governments become less durable, opposition to established institutions becomes more electorally powerful and political conflicts over migration, identity and sovereignty increasingly shape the EU’s ability to act collectively. The challenge is not simply electoral. It concerns the future architecture of European governance.

The End of the Old European Political Order

For much of the post-war period, European politics operated through a relatively stable political structure. Centre-left social democratic parties and centre-right Christian democratic or conservative parties alternated in government across much of Western Europe. Liberal parties frequently acted as coalition partners, while more radical forces remained outside the political mainstream. European integration itself benefited from this arrangement because the dominant political families broadly agreed on the fundamental direction of the European project even when they disagreed over economic and social policy.

That structure has been weakening for decades. The combined electoral dominance of centre-left and centre-right parties has declined, party systems have fragmented and new political movements have emerged around issues that do not fit neatly within the traditional economic left-right divide. Carnegie Europe notes that hundreds of new political groups have entered European political competition over the past three decades as the vote shares of historically dominant parties have declined. The result is not simply a shift from left to right but the erosion of the old two-bloc political system itself.

This fragmentation has fundamentally altered coalition politics. Where two or three parties once could create relatively coherent governments, several countries now require complex multiparty arrangements involving parties with substantially different positions. Coalition negotiations become longer, governments become more internally divided and voters can struggle to identify which party is responsible for particular policies. Radical-right parties benefit from this environment because they can present themselves as alternatives to an interconnected political establishment rather than merely another participant within it.

The irony is that attempts to exclude such parties can sometimes reinforce this narrative. When several mainstream parties must cooperate to prevent a radical-right party from entering government, the resulting coalition may span large ideological distances. The radical party can then portray almost every governing force as part of a single establishment. Political isolation may therefore limit its institutional power while simultaneously strengthening its anti-system political message.

The Radical Right Has Moved from Protest to Power

The transformation becomes more significant when parties move from protest politics toward government. A movement campaigning outside institutions can promise sweeping changes without confronting the practical constraints of budgets, courts, coalition agreements, EU law or international commitments. Government creates a different test.

Italy illustrates the complexity. Giorgia Meloni entered office as the leader of Brothers of Italy, a party rooted outside the traditional European centre-right. In government, however, she has maintained Italy’s NATO commitments, supported Ukraine and worked within EU institutions while continuing to pursue a distinctly conservative domestic political agenda. Her experience demonstrates that participation in government can moderate some positions without eliminating ideological differences.

At the same time, governing can create space for another challenger further to the right. Former general Roberto Vannacci has created National Future and is attempting to attract voters who believe Meloni has become too constrained by NATO, Brussels and conventional government. In a September 2026 Calabria by-election, however, Meloni’s governing coalition candidate received roughly 53 percent while National Future obtained around 10 percent, below some expectations. The result illustrates both the existence of a political constituency to Meloni’s right and the limits of assuming that every new radical-right movement will automatically translate visibility into electoral dominance.

This pattern matters across Europe. Once a formerly insurgent party becomes part of the political establishment, another actor can claim the anti-establishment space it previously occupied. The political spectrum can therefore continue shifting even after radical-right parties enter government.

Germany Has Become a Crucial Test

Germany is particularly important because the Federal Republic’s post-war political culture developed unusually strong barriers against extremist politics. The rise of Alternative for Germany therefore has implications beyond Germany’s borders.

In September 2026, the AfD received 43.8 percent in Saxony-Anhalt’s state election, more than doubling its previous result there and moving within reach of leading a state government. The result does not mean the AfD commands comparable support across Germany, nor does a regional election directly predict a federal result. Regional political conditions matter, and eastern Germany possesses distinctive demographic, economic and historical dynamics.

Nevertheless, the scale of the result demonstrates that exclusion from coalition government has not prevented the party from expanding its electoral base in some regions. This presents mainstream parties with an increasingly difficult governance problem. If they maintain a strict firewall against cooperation, forming governments may require increasingly broad coalitions. If the firewall is weakened, the AfD could gain access to executive authority and the institutional legitimacy accompanying it.

Neither development is politically trivial. The German case therefore represents a wider European dilemma: democratic systems must simultaneously respect electoral outcomes, preserve constitutional norms and construct governments capable of functioning effectively. As party fragmentation increases, achieving all three objectives becomes more complicated.

France Could Become Europe’s Most Consequential Political Test

If Germany illustrates the growth of radical-right opposition, France demonstrates the possibility that such politics could reach the presidency of one of Europe’s most powerful states. The National Rally has spent years transforming itself from a party widely regarded as politically untouchable into a major national electoral force.

The 2027 presidential election is therefore being watched across Europe. A September 28 poll placed Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the two leading first-round candidates under the scenarios tested, reflecting weakness among several centrist alternatives. But polling seven months before the election cannot establish the eventual result, particularly in France’s two-round system, where candidate selection, alliances and campaign events can substantially change voter behaviour.

The importance of France lies in its institutional power. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear power, a central actor in European defence and one half of the historically crucial Franco-German relationship. Changes in French policy can therefore affect the direction of the entire EU.

The debate is not merely about migration. The National Rally’s positions potentially intersect with EU governance, enlargement, climate policy, relations with Russia, economic sovereignty and the distribution of authority between Paris and Brussels. ECFR analysis notes significant differences even within the French radical right and cautions against assuming that a future French government would simply align with every other European right-wing party.

France consequently illustrates why the rise of the right cannot be understood simply as the creation of a unified nationalist bloc. Nationalism itself produces divergent national interests.

Migration Opened the Door, but Economics Is Keeping It Open

Migration has been one of the strongest drivers of radical-right politics in Europe, but it no longer operates alone. The electoral coalition supporting these parties increasingly includes citizens concerned about purchasing power, housing, energy, welfare provision, crime and economic insecurity.

The political effectiveness of migration as an issue comes partly from its ability to connect material and cultural anxieties. A debate about immigration can simultaneously become a debate about housing availability, schools, welfare budgets, public safety, labour markets, religion, national identity and control of borders.

Mainstream parties initially often treated these concerns as belonging principally to the radical right. That distinction has weakened. Centre-right and even some centre-left governments have adopted stricter migration positions, strengthened border policies and placed greater emphasis on deportation and integration requirements.

This creates an important paradox. Radical-right parties can influence policy without governing because mainstream competitors adapt to issues on which those parties have gained voters. Electoral influence therefore cannot be measured simply by counting cabinet positions.

A party may remain outside government while changing the agenda inside government.

The 2026 Energy Shock Is Creating a New Political Accelerator

Europe’s current energy crisis adds another source of pressure. High oil and gas prices generated by the Middle Eastern conflict are affecting household bills, transportation costs and industrial competitiveness at precisely the moment several European countries are approaching important elections.

Radical-right parties are attempting to connect these costs with broader criticisms of European climate, sanctions and foreign policies. Euronews reported in September that Europe’s energy shock was already becoming a major theme for such parties, with recent German regional gains intensifying concerns about the political consequences of high energy prices.

The important analytical point is not whether those arguments are economically correct in every case. It is that energy inflation provides a politically powerful mechanism through which distant geopolitical events enter domestic electoral politics.

A household does not experience the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical concept. It experiences higher petrol, electricity or heating costs.

When governments explain those increases through complex arguments involving international security, sanctions, climate transition and global markets, opposition movements can respond with a much simpler message: the existing political system made life more expensive.

Complexity tends to favour governments when conditions are stable. Crisis can favour movements capable of reducing complicated problems to politically compelling narratives.

The Working-Class Vote Is Being Reorganised

One of the deepest transformations concerns social class. In several European countries, working-class voters who historically supported social democratic or communist parties have shifted toward nationalist or radical-right movements.

This change challenges the traditional political map. Economic redistribution no longer determines political identity as strongly as it once did. Cultural questions, migration, national identity and attitudes toward institutions increasingly interact with class.

The new right has recognised this opportunity. ECFR’s 2026 study of the broader movement argues that its political strength comes partly from its construction of a new social coalition, particularly among working-class voters, combined with a political agenda centred on national culture and highly effective use of contemporary digital communications.

This helps explain why simply describing these voters as ideologically extreme provides little analytical value. Many are not moving through a conventional ideological journey from moderate politics toward historical far-right doctrine. They may instead be responding to perceptions that established parties no longer represent their economic, cultural or geographic interests.

Former industrial regions, rural areas, smaller cities and communities distant from prosperous metropolitan centres can experience political change differently from major capitals. Electoral geography is therefore becoming a map of perceived inclusion and exclusion from Europe’s economic and cultural transformation.

Social Media Has Changed the Political Battlefield

The rise of the radical right cannot be separated from the transformation of political communication. Traditional European parties developed in an era dominated by newspapers, television broadcasters, trade unions, churches and local party organisations. Digital platforms have weakened many of these gatekeepers.

Political movements no longer require large institutional structures to reach millions of citizens. Short videos, influencers, podcasts, memes and algorithmically distributed content can bypass traditional journalism and communicate directly with voters.

This environment often rewards emotional clarity over institutional complexity. Anger, fear, humour and outrage travel rapidly. Nuanced explanations of EU legislation or fiscal policy are more difficult to communicate through formats designed around seconds of attention.

Radical and populist movements have often adapted effectively to this environment because anti-establishment communication naturally fits platforms built around disruption and direct engagement.

The governance challenge extends beyond misinformation. Even entirely factual political communication can produce polarisation when citizens inhabit fundamentally different information ecosystems. Democracies require disagreement, but democratic compromise becomes harder when groups no longer share common sources of information or even common definitions of the problems governments should solve.

The European Union Is Both the Target and the Constraint

The EU occupies a contradictory position in this political transformation. Radical-right parties frequently criticise Brussels as an institution that has accumulated excessive authority over national governments. Yet many have moved away from advocating withdrawal from the Union.

Brexit changed the strategic calculation. Leaving the EU demonstrated the enormous practical complexity of disentanglement. For many nationalist parties, transforming Europe from inside has become more attractive than leaving it.

This represents a major evolution.

The central contest may no longer be between pro-European parties and parties seeking to destroy the EU. It may increasingly be between different visions of what the EU should become.

One vision emphasises deeper integration, shared European sovereignty and stronger supranational institutions. Another seeks a Europe of sovereign nations in which member states reclaim greater authority over migration, climate, social and legal policy while cooperating selectively where national interests coincide.

If the second vision gains greater influence inside the European Council and Parliament, European integration could change without any treaty formally dismantling the Union.

The struggle over Europe’s future may therefore occur inside EU institutions rather than against them.

The Radical Right Is Not a Single European Bloc

This distinction is essential. The term “European far right” can create the misleading impression that these parties constitute a coherent international alliance.

They do not.

Their positions toward Russia differ. Their views on NATO differ. Economic programmes range from market-oriented nationalism to extensive welfare protection. Some strongly support Ukraine; others question military assistance. Some seek confrontation with Brussels while others attempt to influence EU policy pragmatically.

National interests also generate unavoidable tensions. A nationalist government in Poland may view Russia differently from nationalist forces elsewhere. Italian priorities in the Mediterranean differ from those of northern European parties. Governments disagree over migration burden-sharing because border states and destination countries confront different pressures.

Even their definition of sovereignty creates structural obstacles to cooperation. Parties committed to restoring national control will inevitably disagree when their national interests conflict.

The rise of these parties therefore does not automatically produce a unified right-wing Europe.

It produces a more politically fragmented Europe in which nationalist governments may cooperate on some questions and clash sharply on others.

The Real Risk for Governance Is Fragmentation

For EIPG, the most important consequence is therefore not ideology alone but governability.

European democracies increasingly need coalitions containing more parties with wider ideological differences. Governments can become harder to form and easier to destabilise. Policy compromises may become slower precisely when Europe confronts wars, energy disruption, migration pressures, fiscal constraints and strategic competition.

At the EU level, fragmentation can be even more consequential because many important decisions already require complicated negotiations among 27 governments.

If national elections produce governments with sharply different positions on Ukraine, migration, sanctions, climate policy, enlargement or EU budgets, collective action becomes more difficult.

A fragmented Europe does not necessarily become undemocratic.

But it can become less governable.

That distinction matters enormously for peace and security. Political systems that cannot make timely decisions during crises can lose public confidence, which can generate further support for movements promising more decisive national leadership.

Political fragmentation can therefore become self-reinforcing.

Democratic Exclusion Carries Its Own Risks

European institutions face another difficult question: how should democratic systems respond to parties that challenge elements of the existing political order while attracting large numbers of voters?

There is no simple answer.

Democracies possess both procedural and constitutional dimensions. Electoral legitimacy does not permit governments to disregard courts, civil liberties or constitutional rules. At the same time, systematically treating millions of voters as politically illegitimate can deepen alienation from democratic institutions.

The distinction between protecting constitutional democracy and protecting established political parties is therefore essential.

Institutions should defend the rules of democratic competition rather than guarantee particular electoral outcomes.

This means strong courts, independent election administration, transparent political finance, pluralistic media and protection of minority rights remain important regardless of which political party governs.

Democratic resilience is strongest when institutions can absorb electoral change without either collapsing or attempting to prevent legitimate political competition.

The Peace Dimension Is Often Overlooked

For a peace and governance institute, the rise of radical-right politics also matters because domestic political fragmentation can influence Europe’s capacity to manage conflicts beyond its borders.

EU sanctions require political cohesion. Enlargement requires sustained agreement among member states. Support for Ukraine depends on national governments maintaining domestic political legitimacy for substantial financial and military commitments. Migration agreements require cooperation among states with very different geographic interests.

If elections increasingly revolve around prioritising national interests over collective European strategies, maintaining long-term policies becomes more difficult.

This does not mean nationalist governments necessarily oppose peace or European security cooperation. Some advocate strong defence policies precisely in the name of national sovereignty.

The challenge is institutional: European peace policy depends on collective action among states whose domestic political incentives are becoming increasingly divergent.

A Europe with more nationalist governments may therefore remain capable of cooperation, but cooperation will likely become more transactional.

2027 Could Become a Major Stress Test for European Governance

The next electoral cycle deserves particular attention because France, Italy, Poland and Spain—four of the EU’s largest member states—are expected to hold significant national elections in 2027. Carnegie Europe identifies this cluster of contests as a potentially important test for EU governance amid political fragmentation and the growth of radical-right parties.

Their outcomes should not be predicted. European campaigns remain fluid, national electoral systems differ considerably and opinion polls provide snapshots rather than predetermined results.

What can already be observed is that the political environment in which those elections will occur differs markedly from that of a decade earlier.

Europe faces high energy costs, geopolitical confrontation, the continuing consequences of the Ukraine war, migration pressures, increased defence spending and weak economic growth in parts of the continent. Traditional governing parties must therefore defend complex policy compromises while opposition movements can campaign against the accumulated costs of several simultaneous crises.

The political centre is consequently entering these contests under pressure from both right and left.

The defining feature of 2027 may therefore be less a simple rightward shift than the continued erosion of the centrist political monopoly that shaped European integration for decades.

Europe Is Not Simply Moving Right — Its Political System Is Being Rebuilt

The political transformation unfolding across Europe should not be reduced to the claim that the far right is “taking over” the continent. That description is too simple and, as of September 2026, factually overstates the situation. The European Parliament remains led numerically by the EPP, traditional parties continue to govern many member states and radical-right parties remain divided by ideology, geography and national interests.

But dismissing the transformation would be equally misleading.

The radical and nationalist right has become a permanent component of European political competition. It has entered governments, expanded regional support, influenced mainstream migration policy and changed debates over sovereignty, climate, security and European integration. Germany’s recent regional elections illustrate the depth of support such movements can achieve in particular regions, while France’s approaching presidential contest demonstrates that political forces once excluded from serious consideration for executive power now occupy a central position in national electoral competition.

The more important transformation is happening beneath individual election results. The political structure that supported European integration for decades is fragmenting. The old centre-left/centre-right duopoly has weakened. Class politics has mixed with identity politics. Migration has become intertwined with housing, welfare and security. Energy prices have connected geopolitics to household economics. Digital platforms have weakened traditional political gatekeepers. National sovereignty has returned as a central political concept even while European economies and security systems become more interdependent.

For the European Institute for Peace and Governance (EIPG), this creates a governance challenge rather than simply an ideological one. Europe’s democratic institutions must remain capable of absorbing substantial political change while preserving constitutional rules, peaceful transfers of power, independent institutions and the possibility of political compromise. Attempts to freeze political systems against electoral change can damage legitimacy, while erosion of constitutional safeguards in the name of electoral mandates can damage democracy from the opposite direction.

The coming struggle over Europe will therefore not simply be between “the centre” and “the far right.” It will concern the meaning of sovereignty, the distribution of authority between national governments and Brussels, the relationship between borders and openness, the sustainability of Europe’s welfare systems and the ability of democratic institutions to govern societies experiencing rapid demographic, technological and geopolitical change.

There is also a larger peace implication. The European Union itself emerged from the belief that institutionalised cooperation could prevent national political competition from again becoming destructive geopolitical rivalry. A more nationally assertive Europe does not automatically overturn that achievement. But it makes the mechanisms of cooperation more important because national interests will be expressed more forcefully inside European institutions.

Europe’s next political era may therefore be neither the collapse of the European Union nor an uninterrupted continuation of integration.

It may be an era of contested Europe: governments remaining inside the same Union while disagreeing much more fundamentally over what that Union exists to do.

For peace and governance, that distinction is decisive. The central test will not be whether European voters continue choosing the parties that built the existing political order. In a democracy, they are under no obligation to do so. The test will be whether European institutions can accommodate profound electoral change without losing their capacity for constitutional government, collective action and peaceful political competition.

The most consequential story of Europe’s radical-right rise is therefore not that one political family is approaching power. It is that the political consensus governing Europe for a generation is ending—and a new settlement has not yet taken its place.