The European Institute for Peace and Governance (EIPG)
The war between Russia and Ukraine has entered a fundamentally different phase. Four years after the full-scale invasion, the conflict is no longer defined primarily by large territorial offensives or expectations of a decisive military breakthrough. Instead, it has evolved into a prolonged strategic contest in which both sides seek to exhaust the other’s military capacity, economic resilience and political endurance. The frontlines continue to shift incrementally, but the centre of gravity has expanded far beyond the battlefield to include industrial production, drone warfare, critical infrastructure, long-range precision strikes and the sustainability of international support.
Recent developments illustrate this transformation. Ukraine has intensified long-range drone operations targeting Russian oil infrastructure, logistics hubs and military facilities far from the front, while Russia has increased the scale and frequency of missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy systems and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, both countries are investing heavily in defence production, electronic warfare and unmanned technologies, signalling that the conflict is increasingly becoming a competition between industrial resilience and technological adaptation rather than conventional manoeuvre warfare alone.
This paper argues that the Russia–Ukraine war has evolved into a conflict of strategic endurance. Military operations remain important, but the decisive question is no longer which side can capture territory more rapidly. Instead, the outcome will increasingly depend on which state—and which coalition—can sustain political cohesion, technological innovation, defence production and economic resilience over an extended period. These developments carry profound implications not only for Ukraine and Russia but also for European governance, NATO’s future posture and the broader international security order.
The character of the Russia–Ukraine war has changed significantly since its initial stages in 2022. During the first year of the conflict, strategic attention focused largely on territorial advances, defensive operations and the possibility of rapid military victory by one side. Subsequent counteroffensives and positional battles demonstrated that neither Russia nor Ukraine could achieve decisive success through conventional operations alone. As the war entered its fourth year, expectations of rapid battlefield breakthroughs gradually gave way to recognition that the conflict had become one of long-term attrition.
This transformation reflects more than military stalemate. Both Russia and Ukraine have fundamentally adapted their operational strategies. Large-scale armoured manoeuvres have become increasingly constrained by persistent surveillance, precision-guided munitions and widespread drone deployment. Every concentration of forces can now be detected rapidly, making surprise offensives significantly more difficult than during earlier stages of the war. Consequently, military planners increasingly prioritise long-range strike capabilities, electronic warfare, intelligence integration and industrial production over traditional mass manoeuvre.
The battlefield has simultaneously expanded far beyond the immediate frontlines. Russian missile and drone attacks increasingly target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, logistics networks and urban centres, while Ukrainian long-range drones now reach military and industrial targets deep inside Russian territory. Recent attacks on oil refineries and logistics facilities illustrate Kyiv’s growing ability to project military pressure hundreds—and in some cases thousands—of kilometres beyond the battlefield.
This evolution has fundamentally altered the strategic logic of the conflict. Military success is increasingly measured not only by territorial control but by the ability to degrade the opponent’s industrial capacity, complicate military logistics and impose long-term economic costs. Oil refineries, ammunition depots, rail infrastructure, defence factories and communication networks have become strategic objectives because they sustain military operations over time. The war has therefore entered an era in which industrial resilience is becoming as important as battlefield performance.
For Europe, these developments carry significant implications. The conflict is no longer simply a regional war on the European Union’s eastern border. It is reshaping European defence policy, industrial planning, economic governance and strategic resilience. European governments are adapting to a security environment characterised by prolonged confrontation rather than temporary crisis. Defence production, critical infrastructure protection, cyber resilience and long-term military assistance have become permanent policy priorities rather than emergency responses.
This paper analyses the latest strategic evolution of the Russia–Ukraine war by examining how military innovation, industrial capacity and political endurance have become the principal determinants of success. It argues that Europe must understand the conflict not as a frozen battlefield but as a rapidly evolving strategic competition whose lessons will shape European security policy long after active hostilities eventually cease.
From Territorial Warfare to Strategic Attrition
The most significant transformation in the Russia–Ukraine war is not the movement of the front line but the changing nature of the conflict itself. During the first years of the war, military success was measured primarily through territorial gains, liberated cities and defensive lines. Today, although fighting remains intense across several sectors, neither Russia nor Ukraine appears capable of achieving a decisive military breakthrough in the short term. Instead, both sides have increasingly shifted toward a strategy of long-term attrition designed to weaken the opponent’s military capacity, industrial base and political resilience over time.
This strategic transition reflects the realities of modern warfare. Dense surveillance networks, satellite intelligence, persistent drone reconnaissance and precision-guided weapons have made large-scale manoeuvre operations significantly more difficult than in previous conflicts. Every concentration of troops, artillery systems or logistical convoys can be detected more rapidly than ever before, reducing the possibility of achieving operational surprise. As a result, commanders increasingly prioritise limited tactical advances supported by long-range strikes rather than large mechanised offensives capable of rapidly changing the overall strategic balance.
One of the clearest indicators of this shift has been the growing importance of long-range drone warfare. Ukraine has expanded attacks against military airfields, logistics centres, oil refineries and industrial facilities deep inside Russian territory, seeking to increase the economic and military costs of the war far beyond the immediate battlefield. Russia has simultaneously intensified its use of missiles and unmanned aerial systems against Ukrainian cities, electricity networks, transportation infrastructure and defence industries. The objective for both sides extends beyond physical destruction. These attacks seek to disrupt military production, complicate logistics, undermine public morale and force the opponent to divert valuable air-defence resources away from frontline operations.
The battlefield itself has therefore become increasingly multidimensional. Conventional ground combat continues along the front, yet strategic competition now extends into cyberspace, industrial production, energy infrastructure and electronic warfare. Military success is no longer determined exclusively by which side controls additional kilometres of territory. Instead, it increasingly depends on the ability to maintain defence production, protect critical infrastructure, sustain logistics and continuously adapt to rapidly evolving technologies. The conflict has become one in which resilience and innovation are as important as battlefield manoeuvre.
Industrial capacity now occupies a central position within military strategy. Russia has significantly expanded defence manufacturing while adapting parts of its civilian industrial base to support wartime production. Ukraine, despite operating under continuous missile attacks, has also accelerated domestic defence manufacturing, particularly in unmanned systems, electronic warfare technologies and long-range strike capabilities. At the same time, both countries remain heavily dependent upon their broader industrial ecosystems. Ammunition production, vehicle maintenance, precision electronics and repair facilities increasingly determine operational endurance. Victory therefore depends not only upon military leadership but also upon the ability of national economies to sustain prolonged conflict.
This transformation has also altered the role of technology. Artificial intelligence, autonomous drones, electronic warfare systems and digital battlefield management have become increasingly integrated into military operations. Small unmanned systems capable of reconnaissance, precision strikes and battlefield surveillance now influence tactical decision-making at every level. Electronic warfare has evolved into a continuous struggle to disrupt communications, navigation systems and drone operations, creating an environment in which technological adaptation occurs almost as rapidly as battlefield operations themselves. Military organisations capable of learning and innovating more quickly increasingly gain operational advantages regardless of numerical superiority.
The political dimension of attrition is equally significant. Both Russia and Ukraine understand that the conflict will not be decided solely through military engagements. Maintaining domestic public support, sustaining economic activity and preserving international partnerships have become essential components of national strategy. Ukraine continues to depend heavily upon military, financial and political assistance from European partners and the United States, while Russia seeks to demonstrate that its economy and defence industry can withstand prolonged sanctions and external pressure. Consequently, the war has become not only a contest between two armed forces but also between two systems of political endurance.
For Europe, this evolution fundamentally changes the nature of strategic planning. The conflict can no longer be understood as a temporary emergency requiring short-term assistance. Instead, it represents a prolonged security challenge demanding sustained defence production, long-term military support, industrial coordination and institutional resilience. European governments increasingly recognise that maintaining assistance to Ukraine involves more than supplying weapons. It requires expanding defence industries, strengthening logistics networks, protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring that military support remains politically and economically sustainable over many years.
Ultimately, the Russia–Ukraine war has entered a phase in which time itself has become a strategic variable. Both sides are attempting to convince the other that continued resistance will become increasingly costly and ultimately unsustainable. Territorial gains remain important, but they are no longer the sole measure of strategic success. The decisive question has become which country—and which supporting coalition—can maintain military effectiveness, economic resilience and political cohesion longer. In this new phase of the conflict, endurance has become as valuable as firepower, and strategic patience may ultimately prove more decisive than any individual battlefield victory.
The Expansion of the Battlefield: Long-Range Strikes and the New Logic of Escalation
One of the defining characteristics of the current phase of the Russia–Ukraine war is the steady expansion of the battlefield far beyond the traditional front lines. Military operations are no longer confined to contested regions in eastern and southern Ukraine. Instead, both Russia and Ukraine have increasingly sought to project military pressure deep into each other’s territory through long-range drones, cruise missiles and precision strike capabilities. As a result, the distinction between the battlefield and the strategic rear has become progressively blurred. Industrial facilities, energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, air bases and transportation networks now constitute integral components of the war itself rather than merely supporting military operations.
Ukraine has significantly expanded its long-range strike campaign over the past year. Rather than concentrating exclusively on military positions near the front, Ukrainian forces increasingly target Russian ammunition depots, oil refineries, railway infrastructure, military airfields and defence production facilities located hundreds of kilometres from the battlefield. This strategy reflects an important adaptation to Russia’s larger military and industrial capacity. Instead of attempting to match Russian forces through conventional attrition alone, Ukraine seeks to increase the economic and logistical costs of sustaining military operations. Every disrupted fuel depot, damaged refinery or interrupted railway line complicates Russia’s ability to maintain prolonged military campaigns.
Russia has responded by intensifying its own long-range strike operations. Missile and drone attacks increasingly focus on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, defence industries, transportation systems and urban centres. Beyond their immediate military effects, these operations are intended to weaken Ukraine’s economic resilience, disrupt industrial production and place sustained pressure on civilian infrastructure. Electricity generation, railway networks, ammunition storage facilities and manufacturing plants have all become frequent targets because they directly influence Ukraine’s long-term capacity to sustain resistance. The objective is no longer limited to supporting battlefield operations; it is to reduce the overall resilience of the Ukrainian state.
This mutual expansion of strategic strikes has fundamentally altered the logic of escalation. Earlier stages of the conflict were often characterised by concerns that attacks deep inside national territory might trigger uncontrollable escalation. Today, long-range attacks have become a routine element of military planning. Both sides increasingly accept that critical infrastructure, military production facilities and logistical networks located far from active combat zones remain legitimate operational targets. The geographic boundaries of the war have therefore expanded considerably without necessarily producing corresponding political escalation between Russia and NATO.
The widespread use of long-range drones has accelerated this transformation. Compared with traditional cruise missiles or ballistic systems, drones provide relatively inexpensive capabilities capable of reaching strategic targets over considerable distances. Their affordability allows both sides to conduct sustained strike campaigns while forcing opponents to expend expensive air-defence interceptors protecting infrastructure far behind the front. This growing imbalance between low-cost offensive systems and high-cost defensive responses has emerged as one of the defining economic characteristics of the conflict. The challenge is no longer simply intercepting every incoming drone but determining how to protect critical national infrastructure without exhausting increasingly valuable defensive resources.
Air defence has consequently become one of the most strategically important capabilities in the war. The effectiveness of modern air-defence networks influences not only military operations but also industrial production, civilian morale and economic stability. Governments must continuously determine which facilities receive priority protection, recognising that available defensive systems remain insufficient to protect every potential target simultaneously. This has encouraged greater investment in integrated air-defence networks, electronic warfare capabilities and counter-drone technologies capable of reducing dependence upon expensive missile interceptors.
Another important consequence concerns the defence industrial base itself. Military factories, repair facilities and logistics centres have become priority objectives because modern warfare depends increasingly upon continuous production rather than pre-war stockpiles. The destruction of manufacturing capacity may generate strategic effects extending far beyond immediate battlefield losses. Consequently, both Russia and Ukraine have dispersed elements of defence production, strengthened industrial security and increased redundancy throughout critical supply chains. Industrial resilience is now considered an operational requirement rather than simply an economic objective.
The expansion of long-range warfare also carries important political implications. Civilian populations located hundreds of kilometres from active combat increasingly experience the direct consequences of military operations through air-raid alerts, infrastructure disruption and attacks on strategic facilities. This geographical expansion influences public perceptions of security and reinforces the understanding that modern conflict extends well beyond conventional front lines. Governments must therefore balance military effectiveness with the protection of civilian infrastructure, economic continuity and public confidence.
For Europe, these developments offer important strategic lessons. Modern deterrence can no longer focus exclusively on defending national borders. Critical infrastructure—including energy systems, transport networks, communications facilities, ports and defence industries—must increasingly be viewed as integral components of national security. European governments are therefore investing more heavily in integrated air defence, early warning systems, resilient infrastructure and civil preparedness, recognising that future conflicts may involve sustained long-range attacks designed to weaken societies rather than simply defeat armies.
Ultimately, the expansion of the battlefield reflects a broader transformation in the character of contemporary warfare. Military success increasingly depends upon the ability to disrupt the opponent’s strategic depth while simultaneously protecting one’s own industrial and economic foundations. The Russia–Ukraine war demonstrates that future conflicts are likely to be fought not only across conventional front lines but throughout entire national territories, where infrastructure, production capacity and societal resilience become decisive elements of military power.
Europe’s Strategic Dilemma: Sustaining Ukraine Without Weakening Its Own Security
As the war enters its fifth year, Europe faces a challenge fundamentally different from the emergency response that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The immediate objective of preventing Ukraine’s collapse has gradually evolved into the more complex task of sustaining long-term military, economic and political support while simultaneously strengthening Europe’s own security architecture. This dual responsibility has become one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting European governments. Supporting Ukraine is no longer viewed solely as an act of solidarity; it has become an integral component of Europe’s broader security strategy. Yet maintaining that support over an extended period requires resources, industrial capacity and political consensus that are increasingly difficult to sustain indefinitely.
One of the most significant challenges concerns defence production. During the early stages of the war, European countries relied heavily on existing military stockpiles to provide Ukraine with artillery ammunition, air-defence systems, armoured vehicles and precision weapons. Over time, however, these reserves have diminished considerably. Governments increasingly recognise that continued assistance cannot depend upon transferring existing inventories alone. Instead, Europe must expand its own defence industrial capacity sufficiently to replenish national stockpiles while simultaneously supplying Ukraine. The war has therefore accelerated a structural transformation of the European defence industry, shifting its focus from peacetime efficiency towards sustained wartime production.
This industrial expansion represents more than an economic adjustment. It reflects a broader strategic lesson emerging from the conflict: modern wars consume military equipment at a rate far exceeding pre-war planning assumptions. Ammunition, missiles, drones, armoured vehicles and air-defence interceptors require continuous replenishment rather than occasional procurement. European governments are consequently investing in new production facilities, long-term procurement contracts and cross-border industrial cooperation designed to increase manufacturing capacity over the coming decade. Defence production has become an essential element of deterrence rather than simply a supporting component of military capability.
The financial dimension is equally significant. Military assistance to Ukraine, increased defence expenditure, reconstruction planning and economic support collectively require sustained public investment at a time when many European economies continue to face inflationary pressures, demographic challenges and growing demands on healthcare, pensions and public services. Policymakers must therefore balance immediate security requirements with long-term fiscal sustainability. The political challenge is not merely securing funding for Ukraine but maintaining public support for those expenditures during a conflict that increasingly appears prolonged rather than temporary.
Political cohesion has consequently become a strategic asset in its own right. Throughout the conflict, European unity has been one of Ukraine’s most important sources of strength. Coordinated sanctions, military assistance, refugee support and diplomatic cooperation have demonstrated an unprecedented degree of collective action. However, maintaining that unity becomes progressively more difficult as the war continues. Electoral cycles, changing governments, domestic economic pressures and differing national priorities all influence the sustainability of European consensus. Russia’s long-term strategy increasingly appears to assume that political fatigue may eventually weaken Western support more effectively than military pressure alone. Preserving European cohesion is therefore as important strategically as expanding military assistance.
The conflict has also transformed Europe’s understanding of deterrence. Before 2022, many European governments viewed deterrence primarily through the lens of NATO’s collective defence commitments. Today, deterrence encompasses a much broader range of capabilities including industrial resilience, energy security, cyber defence, critical infrastructure protection and technological innovation. The Ukraine war has demonstrated that modern conflicts place sustained pressure upon societies as much as armed forces. Europe’s future security therefore depends not only upon military readiness but also upon resilient institutions capable of functioning effectively during prolonged geopolitical confrontation.
Another emerging challenge concerns strategic prioritisation. Europe must simultaneously support Ukraine, strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, respond to instability in the Middle East, protect maritime trade routes, invest in cybersecurity and prepare for technological competition in areas such as artificial intelligence and space security. These parallel responsibilities increasingly compete for financial resources, industrial capacity and political attention. Policymakers therefore face difficult decisions regarding the allocation of limited strategic resources across multiple theatres without weakening Europe’s overall security posture.
The transatlantic relationship remains central to this equation. The United States continues to play a leading role in supporting Ukraine, yet European governments increasingly acknowledge that they must assume greater responsibility for regional security regardless of future political developments in Washington. This recognition has accelerated discussions concerning European defence capabilities, joint procurement, strategic autonomy and industrial cooperation. Importantly, greater European responsibility is not intended to replace NATO but to strengthen the Alliance by ensuring that Europe possesses greater capacity to contribute to collective security during prolonged crises.
Ukraine itself has become an important source of military innovation. European armed forces increasingly study Ukrainian operational experience in drone warfare, electronic warfare, battlefield intelligence, air-defence integration and civilian resilience. The conflict has effectively become a laboratory for modern warfare, generating lessons that influence military doctrine throughout Europe. Supporting Ukraine therefore contributes not only to immediate regional security but also to the adaptation of European armed forces to the realities of twenty-first-century conflict.
Ultimately, Europe’s strategic dilemma is not whether to support Ukraine or prioritise its own security. The war has demonstrated that these objectives are increasingly inseparable. A secure Ukraine contributes directly to European stability, while a stronger and more resilient Europe enhances its ability to sustain long-term assistance. The real challenge lies in building sufficient political, industrial and economic capacity to achieve both objectives simultaneously.
The coming years are therefore likely to determine not only the future of Ukraine but also the future character of European security itself. If Europe succeeds in transforming short-term crisis management into long-term strategic resilience, the war may ultimately accelerate the emergence of a stronger and more integrated European security architecture. If it fails, the consequences will extend far beyond Ukraine, shaping the credibility of European deterrence and the stability of the continent for years to come.
